LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
- | Read on LessWrong | Large language models often take actions running on one computer (via an agentic harness such as Claude Code or Codex), however the LLMs’ responses to prompts are computed on a different computer with GPU access.
- Could a malicious LLM gain control of the host machine where its weights are loaded?
- Such a machine is a high-value target: it has sufficient compute to run a frontier LLM, offers easy access to the LLM’s weights, and has privileged access to other computers in the datacentre compared with a generic computer on the internet.
Unverified
- | Read on LessWrong | Large language models often take actions running on one computer (via an agentic harness such as Claude Code or Codex), however the LLMs’ responses to prompts are computed on a different computer with GPU access.
- Could a malicious LLM gain control of the host machine where its weights are loaded?
- Such a machine is a high-value target: it has sufficient compute to run a frontier LLM, offers easy access to the LLM’s weights, and has privileged access to other computers in the datacentre compared with a generic computer on the internet.
Sources: Boydkane